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Abstract
Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance
evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks,
insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to
financial risk. We show that by using a coherent measure of risk it
is impossible to allocate risk satisfying the natural requirements of
(Solution) Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong
Monotonicity. To obtain the result we characterize the Shapley value
on the class of totally balanced games and also on the class of exact
games.
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1 Introduction
If a financial enterprise (bank, insurance company, investment fund, etc.)
consists of divisions (individuals, products, subportfolios, etc.), not only is it
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important to measure properly the risk of the main entity, but also to allocate
the diversification benefits to the divisions. Risk allocation can be used for
at least two purposes: for performance evaluation or for allocating internal
capital requirements. In the first case risk is used to calculate risk adjusted
returns for performance evaluation, which crucially depends on the allocated
risk. In the second case the measure of risk is used to determine capital
requirements, which serve as a cushion against default. Holding capital is
costly, hence capital allocation is also important in this case.
To measure risk appropriately we apply coherent measures of risk (Artzner
et al., 1999) defined by four axioms: monotonicity, subadditivity, positive
homogeneity, and translation invariance. These axioms are supported by a
natural general equilibrium approach to measure risk (Cso´ka et al., 2007).
Moreover, Acerbi and Scandolo (2008) justify the axioms to incorporate liq-
uidity risk as well. Of these axioms, subadditivity captures the notion that
the risk of the main unit is at most as large as the sum of the risks of the
divisions, since there is a diversification effect.
Risk allocation games (Denault, 2001) are transferable utility cooperative
games defined to model the allocation of diversification benefits. When using
a coherent measure of risk, Cso´ka et al. (2009) show that every risk allocation
game is a totally balanced game, and that there exits a coherent risk measure
such that the class of risk allocation games defined by this coherent risk
measure coincides with the class of totally balanced games. In other words,
the four axioms of coherent measure of risk allows a risk measure such that
the class of risk allocation games defined by this risk measure coincides with
the class of totally balanced games. Cso´ka et al. (2009) also prove that the
class of risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty equals the class
of exact games in the above sense.
A totally balanced game is a cooperative game having a non-empty core
in all of its subgames. Some other applications of totally balanced games
are as follows: market games (Shapley and Shubik, 1969), linear production
games (Owen, 1975), a class of maximum flow problems (Kalai and Zemel,
1982a), generalized network problems (Kalai and Zemel, 1982b), controlled
mathematical programming problems (Dubey and Shapley, 1984), permuta-
tion games of less than four players (Tijs et al., 1984), and a special case of
market games with a continuum of indivisible commodities: cooperation in
fair division (Legut, 1990).
On top of coinciding with risk allocation games with no aggregate uncer-
tainty, exact games are studied with a coalitional structure in Casas-Me´ndez
et al. (2003), they arise from multi-issue allocation games (Calleja et al.,
2005) and multi-choice games (Branzei et al., 2009).
The risk allocation problem in the framework of cooperative game theory
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is the problem of choosing a solution for the given games. In this paper
we use perhaps the most popular one-point solution concept of cooperative
games: the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953).
In a risk allocation game, an allocation rule shows how to share the diver-
sification benefits of the main unit among the divisions, which has of course
consequences on the performance evaluation or on the amount of capital
allocated. In this paper besides having a none-empty core, (1) Core Com-
patibility, we consider three other reasonable properties which a “fair” risk
allocation rule should meet. Young (1985) has characterized the Shapley
value on the class of all games as the only method satisfying (2) Pareto Op-
timality (also called Efficiency), (3) Equal Treatment Property (also called
Symmetry) and (4) Strong Monotonicity. In our opinion, these axioms are
very natural requirements for a “fair” allocation rule. We interpret them as
follows.
Core Compatibility is satisfied if all the risk of the main unit is allocated
in such a way that no coalitions of the divisions would like to object their
allocated risk capital, by saying that their risk is less than the sum of the
risks allocated to the members of the particular coalition.
Pareto Optimality is implied by Core Compatibility, since it requires that
all the risk of the main unit should be allocated.
Equal Treatment Property makes sure that similar divisions are treated
symmetrically, that is if two divisions make the same marginal risk contribu-
tion to all the coalition of divisions not containing them, then the rule should
allocate them the very same risk capital.
Strong Monotonicity requires that if the risk environment changes in such
a way that the marginal contribution of a division is not decreasing, then its
allocated risk capital should not decrease either.
Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity both capture the
idea that the risk of a portfolio depends on the other assets present in the
economy, a notion that is formulated in the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965).
We show that the last three axioms characterize the Shapley value on the
class of totally balanced games and also on the class of exact games. Since the
Shapley value is known to be not core compatible on those classes of games,
we conclude that there is no risk allocation rule which meets the axioms of
Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity.
The challenge in the proof is that the original axiomatization by Young
(1985) was proved on the class of all games. Here we have two subclasses
(totally balanced games and exact games), it is not even guaranteed that the
same axiomatization holds true. We demonstrate that the original proof can
not be adopted, we only succeed by using the result of Pinte´r (2009).
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The other axiomatic approaches in the literature are related to our work
are as follows.
Denault (2001) considers the original axiomatization of the Shapley value
by Shapley (1953), and concludes that there is no allocation which satisfies
Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property, Dummy Player Property (a
riskless division should be allocated its stand-alone risk) and Additivity Over
Games. However, he does not prove that the original axiomatization is true
on the class of totally balanced games, and on top of that Additivity is known
to be not a natural requirement.
Valdez and Chernih (2003) show that for elliptically contoured distribu-
tions the covariance (or beta) method satisfies Core Compatibility, Equal
Treatment Property and Consistency (requiring that that allocation method
should be independent of the hierarchical structure of the main unit). How-
ever, Kim and Hardy (2009) show that it is not even true that the covariance
method satisfies Core Compatibility in their setting. Moreover, profit and
loss distributions of financial assets are not elliptically contoured, but heavy
tailed (Cont, 2001), hence our approach is more general by not restricting
the probability distributions.
Kalkbrener (2005) shows that Linear Aggregation, Diversification and
Continuity characterizes the gradient principle (or Euler method, where risk
is allocated as a result of slightly increasing the weight of all the divisions)
to be the only allocation which satisfies those requirements. Although those
requirements are also natural, they are not related to the marginalistic re-
quirements of Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity. In fact
Kalkbrener (2005) explicitly assumes that the risk allocated to a division
does not depend on the decomposition of the other divisions, only on the
main unit. There is a related impossibility result by Buch and Dorfleitner
(2008). They show that if one uses the gradient principle to allocate risk
and Equal Treatment Property is satisfied, then the measure of risk must be
linear, not allowing for any diversification benefits.
Our result is tight in the sense that we consider a reasonable weaken-
ing of the above listed four axioms of risk allocation. We try to save the
requirements of Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong
Monotonicity by weakening the Core Compatibility requirement as follows.
If a coalition of divisions blocks an allocation, then in the resulting sub-
game the original allocation rule (solution) is applied, and each division
should get more in the subgame than in the blocked allocation. This way the
divisions think one step ahead, and only object an allocation if all of them
individually will get more than before, after applying the same solution for
allocating risk. It is straightforward that it is easier for an allocation to be
4
in the resulting core concept, which we call the solution core.
If we would like to satisfy Pareto Optimality (also implied by Solution
Core Compatibility) Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity,
we would have to allocate risk using the Shapley value, and it should be
in the Shapley core. However, we show an example for a risk allocation
game in which the Shapley value is not in the Shapley core either, thus
we can conclude it is also impossible to allocate risk using Solution Core
Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity.
The setup of the paper is as follows: in the following section we introduce
the concept of risk allocations games. In Section 3 we present our impos-
sibility result, and the last section concludes briefly. The technical part of
Section 3 is relegated to the Appendix.
2 Risk allocation games
To define risk allocation games we use the setup of Cso´ka et al. (2009). Let
S denote the finite number of states of nature and consider the set RS of
realization vectors. State of nature s occurs with probability ps > 0, where∑S
s=1 ps = 1. The vector X ∈ RS represents a division’s possible profit and
loss realizations at a given time in the future. The amount Xs is the division’s
payoff in state of nature s. Negative values of Xs correspond to losses.
A measure of risk is a function ρ : RS → R measuring the risk of a
division from the perspective of the present.
Definition 2.1. A function ρ : RS → R is called a coherent measure of risk
(Artzner et al., 1999) if it satisfies the following axioms:
1. Monotonicity : for all X, Y ∈ RS such that Y ≥ X, we have ρ(Y ) ≤
ρ(X).
2. Subadditivity : for all X, Y ∈ RS, we have ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y ).
3. Positive homogeneity : for all X ∈ RS and h ∈ R+, we have ρ(hX) =
hρ(X).
4. Translation invariance: for all X ∈ RS and a ∈ R, we have ρ(X +
a1S) = ρ(X)− a.
For the interpretation of the axioms see Acerbi and Scandolo (2008), who
justify them to incorporate liquidity risk as well.
A well known coherent measure of risk is the maximum loss (Acerbi and
Tasche, 2002).
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Definition 2.2. Let the outcomes be equiprobable. The maximum loss of
the realization vector X is defined by
ML(X) = −min
s∈S
Xs. (1)
Suppose a financial enterprise has n divisions. We study if the risk of the
main unit as measured by a coherent measure of risk can be allocated to its
constituents satisfying certain requirements to be defined in Definition 3.2.
The required cooperative game theoretical definitions are as follows.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote a finite set of players. A cooperative game with
transferable utility (game, for short) is given by a value function v : 2N → R
with v({∅}) = 0. The class of games with player set N is denoted by GN .
An allocation is a vector x ∈ Rn, where xi is the payoff of player i ∈ N .
An allocation x yields payoff x(C) =
∑
i∈C xi to a coalition C ∈ 2N . An
allocation x ∈ Rn is called Pareto Optimal1, if x(N) = v(N); Individually
Rational, if xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N, and Coalitionally Rational if x(C) ≥
v(C) for all C ∈ 2N . The core (Gillies, 1959) is the set of Pareto Optimal
and Coalitionally Rational allocations. The core of game v is denoted by
core (v).
For a game v ∈ GN and a coalition C ∈ 2N , a subgame (C, vC) is obtained
by restricting v to subsets of C.
Definition 2.3. A game is totally balanced, if its each subgame has a non-
empty core.
Let GNtb denote the class of totally balanced games with player set N .
An interesting subclass of totally balanced games is the class of exact games
(Shapley, 1971; Schmeidler, 1972).
Definition 2.4. A game v ∈ GN is exact, if for each C ∈ 2N there exists a
core allocation x such that x(C) = v(C).
Let GNe denote the class of exact games with player set N .
Resuming to risk allocation, let the matrix of realization vectors corre-
sponding to the divisions be given by X ∈ RS×n, and let X·i denote the i-th
column of X, the realization vector of division i. For a coalition of divisions
C ∈ 2N , let XC =
∑
i∈C
X·i.
Definition 2.5. A risk environment is a tuple (N,S, p,X, ρ), where N is the
set of divisions, S indicates the number of states of nature, p = (p1, . . . , pS)
is the vector of realization probabilities of the various states, X is the matrix
of realization vectors, and ρ is a coherent measure of risk.
1In this paper we use the term Pareto Optimal instead of Efficient.
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A risk allocation game assigns to each coalition of divisions the risk in-
volved in the aggregate portfolio of the coalition.
Definition 2.6. Given a risk environment (N,S, p,X, ρ) a risk allocation
game is a game v ∈ GN , where the value function v : 2N → R is defined by
v(C) = −ρ(X(C)) for all C ∈ 2N . (2)
A risk allocation game with n players is induced by the number of states of
nature, their probability of occurrence, n realization vectors and a coherent
measure of risk. Let GNr denote the family of risk allocation games with
player set N . In such a game, according to Equation (2), the larger the risk
of any subset of divisions, the lower its value. We illustrate the definition of
the risk allocation game by the following example.
Example 2.7. Consider the following risk environment (N,S, p,X, ρ). We
have 3 divisions, 7 states of nature with equal probability of occurrence.
Risk is calculated using the matrix of realization vectors (see Table 1) and
the maximum loss (Definition 2.2).
S\XC X{1} X{2} X{3} X{1,2} X{1,3} X{2,3} X{1,2,3}
1 0 1 1 1 1 2 2
2 1 0 1 1 2 1 2
3 1 1 0 2 1 1 2
4 0.5 0.5 1 1 1.5 1.5 2
5 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
6 1 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.5 1 2
7 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
v(C) 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
Table 1: The matrix of realization vectors of a risk environment and the
resulting totally balanced risk allocation game v using the maximum loss.
Note that for all C ∈ 2N \ {∅} the value function is given by v(C) =
−ρ(X(C)) = min
s∈S
Xs.
If the rows of a matrix of realization vectors sum up to the same number,
then there is no aggregate uncertainty. Formally:
Definition 2.8. A matrix of realization vectors X ∈ RS×n has no aggregate
uncertainty, if there exists a number α ∈ R such that X(N) = α1S.
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If there is no aggregate uncertainty, let GNrnau denote the family of risk
allocation games with player set N .
Theorem 2.9. (Cso´ka et al., 2009) The class of risk allocation games coin-
cides with the class of totally balanced games, that is GNr = GNtb. Moreover,
the class of risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty equals the
class of exact games, that is GNrnau = GNe .
Note that by Theorem 2.9 all risk allocation games are totally balanced
(also the one in Example 2.7), and if there is no aggregate uncertainty all of
them are exact. Moreover, there exists a coherent risk measure such that for
any totally balanced (exact game) there is a risk environment (with no ag-
gregate uncertainty) – with the given coherent risk measure – that generates
the given game.
This remark can be used to simulate a random totally balanced or exact
game by randomizing the risk environment. Using the simulation one can
verify if a certain property is satisfied by a random totally balanced or exact
game; or if it is not satisfied, one can easily get a counterexample (Example
3.9) or a feeling about the percentage at which a certain requirement is
violated.
Next, we study what kind of requirements should be satisfied when allo-
cating the diversification benefits (due to the subadditivity axiom of coherent
measures of risk in Definition 2.1) in a risk allocation game.
3 Properties of risk allocation rules
A risk allocation rule shows how to share the risk of the main unit among
the divisions. In this section we analyze risk allocation rules.
First, we introduce further notations: |N | is for the cardinality of set N ,
A ⊂ B means A ⊆ B and A 6= B. Moreover, we use |a| for the absolute
value of a ∈ R.
Let v ∈ GN and i ∈ N be a game and a player, and ∀S ⊆ N let v′i(S) =
v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S). Then v′i : 2N \ {N} → R is called player i’s marginal
contribution function in game v. Alternatively, v′i(S) is player i’s marginal
contribution to coalition S in game v. Player i is a null-player in game v, if
v′i = 0.
Moreover, player i and j are symmetric in game v, i ∼v j, if ∀S ⊆ N such
that i, j /∈ S: v′i(S) = v′j(S). Furthermore, if S ⊆ N is such that ∀i, j ∈ S:
i ∼v j, then we say that S is an equivalence set in v.
A game v ∈ GN is strictly convex if ∀i ∈ N , ∀T, Z ⊆ N \ {i} such that
Z ⊂ T : v′i(Z) < v′i(T ).
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Throughout the paper we consider single-valued solutions. A function
ψ : A → RN , defined on A ⊆ GN , is called a solution on the class of games
A. In the context of risk allocation problems, we refer to solutions as risk
allocation rules.
For arbitrary game v ∈ GN the Shapley solution φ is given by
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
v′i(S)
|S|!(|N \ S| − 1)!
|N |! i ∈ N,
where φi(v) is also called the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) of player i in
game v.
We illustrate the marginal contribution function and the fact that the
Shapley value is not always in the core by continuing Example 2.7.
Example 3.1. Consider the risk allocation game in Example 2.7.
C ∅ {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
v(C) 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
v′1(C) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
v′2(C) 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
v′3(C) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Table 2: The value function of a risk allocation game and the marginal
contribution functions of players 1, 2 and 3.
Note that player 2 has a higher marginal contribution than the others,
which is also expressed by the Shapley value, since it is φ(v) = (1/6, 2/3, 1/6).
However, coalition {1, 2} blocks the Shapley allocation, since v({1, 2}) = 1 >
1/6 + 2/3 = 5/6.
Next, we introduce the four basic properties (axioms) we recommend a
risk allocation rule (solution) should meet.
Definition 3.2. The solution ψ on class A ⊆ GN satisfies
• Core Compatibility (CC), if ∀v ∈ A: ψ(v) ∈ core (v),
• Pareto Optimality (PO), if ∀v ∈ A: ∑
i∈N
ψi(v) = v(N),
• Equal Treatment Property (ETP ), if ∀v ∈ A, ∀i, j ∈ N : (i ∼v j) ⇒
(ψi(v) = ψj(v)),
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• Strong Monotonicity (SM), if ∀v, w ∈ A, ∀i ∈ N : (v′i ≤ w′i) ⇒
(ψi(v) ≤ ψi(w)).
The financial interpretation of the axioms when applied to a risk alloca-
tion rule is as follows.
Core Compatibility is satisfied if a risk allocation is stable, that is all the
risk of the main unit is allocated and no coalitions of the divisions would like
to object their allocated risk capital, by saying that their risk is less than the
sum of the risks allocated to the members of the particular coalition.
Pareto Optimality2 is implied by Core Compatibility, since requires that
all the risk of the main unit should be allocated to the divisions.
Equal Treatment Property3 makes sure that similar divisions are treated
symmetrically, that is if two divisions make the same marginal risk contribu-
tion to all the coalition of divisions not containing them, then the rule should
allocate them the very same risk capital.
Strong Monotonicity requires that if the risk environment changes such
that the marginal contribution of a division is not decreasing, then its allo-
cated risk capital should not decrease either.
Theorem 3.3. (Young, 1985) Let ψ be a solution on the class of all games.
Then solution ψ satisfies PO, ETP and SM if and only if ψ = φ, that is if
and only if it is the Shapley solution.
Note that risk allocation games are a proper subset of all games, since
they are always totally balanced. We prove a Theorem 3.3 type result on
the class of totally balanced games and also on the class of exact games in
Theorem 3.4. Formally:
Theorem 3.4. Let ψ be a solution either on the class of totally balanced
games or on the class of exact games. Then solution ψ satisfies PO, ETP
and SM if and only if ψ = φ, that is if and only if it is the Shapley solution.
The proof of the above theorem is relegated to the Appendix.
The following example shows that Young (1985)’s proof does not work on
risk allocation games.
Example 3.5. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and v = u{1,2} + u{2,3} − u{1,2,3} + 9uN 4
2It is also called Efficiency in the literature
3It is also called Symmetry in the literature.
4Where uT , the unanimity game on coalition T , is defined as follows: let T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅
be an arbitrary set, then ∀S ⊆ N :
uT (S) =
{
1, if S ⊇ T
0 otherwise
.
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Then v is an exact game, hence it is totally balanced as well. Notice that
player 2 is the only player in game v such that it is not a null-player in any
considered unanimity game.
Young (1985)’s proof goes by induction on the number of unanimity games
needed to span games. Therefore, in the case of game v assume that on all
totally balanced (exact) games spanned by at most three unanimity games
the only solution meeting axioms PO, ETP and SM is the Shapley solution.
Chose player 1 in game v. Then the only considered unanimity game in
which player 1 is a null-player is u{2,3}. By leaving out u{2,3}, however, we
get game u{1,2}−u{1,2,3}+ 9uN , which is not totally balanced, hence it is not
exact either.
Similarly, chose player 3 in game v. Then the only considered unanimity
game in which player 3 is a null-player is u{1,2}. However, by leaving out
u{1,2} we get game u{2,3}−u{1,2,3}+9uN , which is not totally balanced, hence
it is not exact either.
Summing up, we cannot make conclusions about the values of players 1,
2 and 3, therefore, Young (1985)’s proof does not work.
It is worth noticing that if |N | ≤ 2, then Young (1985)’s proof works on
the class of totally balanced games5, and if |N | ≤ 3 then that works on the
class of exact games6. Since in general, Young (1985)’s proof does not work
on the considered classes of games we have to apply a different result: Pinte´r
(2009)’s proof.
Since the axioms of Definition 3.2 are natural requirements for a risk
allocation rule, one can conclude that the only possible way to allocate risk
in a “fair” way (satisfying PO, ETP and SM) is to use the Shapley value.
But as we saw in Example 3.1 the Shapley value is not always in the core
(and CC implies PO), hence it is impossibly to allocate risk satisfying CC,
ETP and SM .
If there is no aggregate uncertainty, we get a proper subset of totally
balanced games, exact games. But Rabie (1981) gives an example of a five
player exact game, where the Shapley value is also not in the core.7 By
Theorem 2.9 this game can be generated by a risk allocation game with no
aggregate uncertainty. Thus we can conclude that in case of no aggregate
5Consider game v = u{1,2} + u{2,3} − u{1,2,3} as a counterexample for the three player
case.
6It is a slight calculation to see that for any three player exact games v =
∑
T
αTuT , ∀T
such that |T | ≥ 2: αT ≥ 0, which implies that Young (1985)’s proof works.
7It is not too difficult to show that there is no such an example for four or less player
exact games, so Rabie (1981)’s counterexample is tight.
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uncertainty it is also impossible to allocate risk in a way such that it satisfies
CC, ETP and SM .
Our final try to save “fair” allocation rules is to consider an other core
concept. In this case if a coalition of divisions blocks an allocation, then
in the resulting subgame the original allocation rule is applied (in our case
the Shapley value), and each division should get more in the subgame than
in the blocked allocation. This way the divisions think one step ahead, and
only object an allocation if all of them individually will get more than before,
after applying the same allocation rule. Formally:
Definition 3.6. Let ψ be an arbitrary solution on set A. The solution core,
ψ-core of game v ∈ A is defined as follows: ψ-core (v) =
{
x ∈ RN
∣∣∣∣∑
i∈N
xi = v(N) and ∀S ⊂ N such that vS ∈ A : ψ(vS) ≯ xS
}
.
It is worth noticing that for any game v core (v) ⊆ ψ-core (v).
Definition 3.7. The solution ψ on class A ⊆ GN is Solution Core Compatible
(ψ-CC) if ∀v ∈ A: ψ(v) ∈ ψ-core (v).
Since we consider risk allocation rules satisfying Pareto Optimality (im-
plied by Core Compatibility), Equal Treatment Property and Strong Mono-
tonicity, and those requirements characterize the Shapley value, it follows
that the risk should also be distributed in the subgame by the Shapley value.
We call this weakened core concept the Shapley core.
To first consider general, totally balanced risk allocation games, let us
check if the Shapley value is in the Shapley core in Example 2.7.
Example 3.8. Consider the risk allocation game in Example 2.7. Then by
Theorem 2.9 v is a totally balanced game, as we saw in Example 3.1 the
Shapley values is φ(v) = (1/6, 2/3, 1/6), but φ(v{1,2}) = (1/2, 1/2). Thus the
blocking coalition {1, 2} is not formed, the Shapley value is in the Shapley
core, since player 2 would be worse off in the subgame v{1,2}. Looking at the
risk environment the intuition is that division 2 is a good hedge against both
1 and 3, but when it is only with one of them, then it does not get enough
by the Shapley allocation.
However, if we consider an other totally balanced game, we see that the
Shapley value is not in the Shapley core either.
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Example 3.9. We present a game that is totally balanced and the Shapley
value is not in the Shapley core. Consider the following game with three
players. Let
v({1}) = v({2}) = v({3}) = 0,
v({1, 2}) = 27,
v({1, 3}) = 19,
v({2, 3}) = 14,
v({1, 2, 3}) = 30.
It is easy to check that v is a totally balanced game, φ(v) = (13, 10.5, 6.5),
v{1,2} is totally balanced and φ(v{1,2}) = (13.5, 13.5). Thus it is worth for both
player 1 and player 2 to deviate and get the Shapley value in subgame v{1,2},
hence the Shapley value is not in the Shapley core.
For exact games, Rabie (1981)’s counterexample works for the Shapley
core as well, thus in that example the Shapley value is not in the Shapley core
either. We note that for exact games with at most four players the Shapley
value is always in the Shapley core, since it is always in the core.
Corollary 3.10. There is no risk allocation rule meeting conditions CC,
ETP and SM , and there is no risk allocation rule ψ such that it meets
conditions ψ-CC, ETP and SM .
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented impossibility results on risk allocation. Ap-
plying game theoretical tools to risk allocation problems, we have considered
four very natural axioms: CC (Core Compatibility), ETP (Symmetry) and
SM (Strong Monotonicity), and we have showed that there is no risk alloca-
tion rule meeting all those three axioms. Later, we have weakened condition
CC to Solution Core Compatibility (ψ-CC) and have presented the same
impossibility result. Our impossibility results are valid even if we consider
risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty.
Appendix
To prove Theorem 3.4 we will apply the following Theorem characterizing
the Shapley value on a subset of games.
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Theorem 4.1. Let set A ⊆ GN be such that ∀v ∈ A, ∀k ∈ N and ∀i ∈
N \ {k}: ∃B ⊆ A, ∃w ∈ A and ∃z(i) ∈ B such that
1. B is M-closed8, that is ∀g ∈ B, ∀S ⊆ N equivalence set in g and
∀j ∈ N \ S: ∃h ∈ B such that S ∪ {j} is an equivalence set in h and
h′j = g
′
j,
2. w′k = v
′
k and ∀i ∈ N \ {k}: z(i)′i = w′i.
Then solution ψ on A is PO, ETP and SM if and only if ψ = φ, that is if
and only if ψ is the Shapley solution.
Proof. See Pinte´r (2009) Theorem 3.3 pp. 4–5. 
In case of risk allocation games, if totally balanced games or exact games
were M -closed, then we could apply a simplified version of Theorem 4.1.
However, the following examples show that none of the considered classes of
games are M -closed.
Example 4.2. (Total balancedness) Let N = {1, 2, 3}, and ∀T ⊆ N let
v(T ) =

0, if |T | ≤ 1 and T 6= {3}
10, if T = {3}
20, if |T | = 2
30, if T = N.
One can check that v is a totally balanced game and S = {1, 2} is an equiv-
alence set in v. However, the only game w such that N is an equivalence set
in w and w′3 = v
′
3, is as follows, ∀T ⊆ N :
w(T ) =

0, if T = ∅
10, if |T | = 1
30, if |T | = 2
40, if T = N
having an empty core.
(Exactness) Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and ∀T ⊆ N let
v(T ) =

0, if |T | ≤ 1
20, if |T | = 2 and 1 ∈ T
10, if |T | = 2 and 1 /∈ T
25, if |T | = 3 and 1 ∈ T
200, if T = {2, 3, 4}
222, if T = N.
8M refers to Marginality of solution ψ, requiring that ∀v, w ∈ A, ∀i ∈ N : (v′i = w′i)⇒
(ψi(v) = ψi(w)). Note that Marginality is implied by Strong Monotonicity.
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One can check that v is an exact game and S = {2, 3, 4} is an equivalence
set in v. However, the only game w such that N is an equivalence set in w
and w′1 = v
′
1 is as follows: ∀T ⊆ N let
w(T ) =

0, if |T | ≤ 1
20, if |T | = 2
35, if |T | = 3
57, if T = N.
Game w(T ) is not exact, since there is no core allocation giving 0 to any one
player coalition (each of the other players should get 20, which is impossible).
It is a slight calculation to see that if |N | ≤ 2, then the class of totally
balanced games is M -closed, and if |N | ≤ 3, then the class of exact games is
also M -closed.
The proof of Theorem 3.4. We will proceed in 6 steps and apply Theorem
4.1 by showing that set B can be the class of strictly convex games for both
totally balanced games and exact games.
Step 1 : Let v ∈ GN be an arbitrary totally balanced / exact game and
let k ∈ N be an arbitrary player. Then let
M ≥ max
S⊆N
|v′k(S)|+ 2
and ∀S ⊆ N let
w(S) =

0, if S = ∅
(M |N |)|S|, if S 6= ∅ and k /∈ S
(M |N |)|(S\{k})| + v′k(S \ {k}) otherwise.
(3)
Then it is easy to see that w′k = v
′
k.
Step 2 : Next we show that for any player i ∈ N \{k}, ∀Z ⊂ T ⊆ N \{i}:
w′i(T )− w′i(Z) > 0 , (4)
that is player i has a strictly convex marginal contribution profile.
Three cases can happen:
k ∈ Z, k /∈ T and k ∈ T \ Z. If k ∈ Z, then
w′k((T \ {k}) ∪ {i})− w′k(T \ {k})
−w′k((Z \ {k}) ∪ {i}) + w′k(Z \ {k}) > −4M.
(5)
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Without loss of generality9 we can assume that |N | ≥ 2.
w((T \ {k}) ∪ {i})− w(T \ {k})− w((Z \ {k}) ∪ {i}) + w(Z \ {k})
> 4M .
(6)
Summing up Inequalities (5) and (6) leads to
w′i(T )− w′i(Z) > 0.
The proofs of the other two cases (k /∈ T and k ∈ T \ Z) are similar.
Step 3 : Next, we show that w has a non-empty core.
∀i ∈ N let
xi =
{
w′k(N \ {k}), if i = k
w(N\{k})
|N\{k}| otherwise.
(7)
Next, we show that x is a core allocation.
It is clear that w(N) =
∑
i∈N
xi and
∑
i∈N\{k}
xi = w(N\{k}). Hence coalition
N \ {k} cannot block allocation x.
Notice that ∀T ⊆ N such that T 6= N \ {k}, and ∀i ∈ N \ {k}:
xi ≥ w(T ). (8)
Next, we show that coalition T cannot block allocation x either. Two
cases can happen:
(1) k /∈ T : Then (remember M ≥ 1)
xi =
(M |N |)|N\{k}|
|N \ {k}| =
M |N |
|N \ {k}|(M |N |)
|N\{k}|−1
≥ (M |N |)|N\{k}|−1 ≥ w(T ).
(2) k ∈ T : Notice that if |N \ {k}| = 1, then the proof is accomplished.
Otherwise, since M ≥ 2 and |N \ {k}| ≥ 2
xi =
M |N |
|N \ {k}|(M |N |)
|N\{k}|−1 ≥M(M |N |)|N\{k}|−1
≥ (M |N |)|T\{k}| +M ≥ w(T ).
9The case of |N | = 1 is trivial.
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Step 4 : Next we show that if v is totally balanced, then w is exact, hence
it is totally balanced as well10.
Let S ⊆ N be an arbitrary non-empty coalition.
w is exact: ∀i ∈ N let
yi =

w′k(N \ {k}), if i = k and k /∈ S
w′k(S \ {k}), if i = k and k ∈ S
w(S\{k})
|S\{k}| , if i 6= k and i ∈ S
w(N\{k})−w(S)
|N\(S∪{k})| , if i /∈ S ∪ {k} and k /∈ S
w(N)−w(S)
|N\S| , if i /∈ S and k ∈ S.
Notice that if S = N , then y = x of Equation (7) and it follows from Step 3
that coalition N \ {k} cannot block allocation y. Moreover, it is clear that∑
i∈N
yi = w(N),
∑
i∈S
yi = w(S) and ∀i ∈ N \ (S ∪ {k}): yi ≥ xi, where xi is
from (7). The construction of w implies that if y can be blocked, then it can
only be blocked via a coalition T such that T \ (S∪{k}) 6= ∅. However, from
Inequality (8) for any i ∈ T \ (S ∪ {k}): yi ≥ xi ≥ w(T ), hence (yi)i∈N is in
the core of w.
Step 5 : Next we construct the game depending on player i, z(i) by re-
peating the construction of w. That is, let i ∈ N \{k} be an arbitrary player.
Moreover, for all S ⊆ N let
z(i)(S) =

0, if S = ∅
(M |N |)|S|, if S 6= ∅ and i /∈ S
(M |N |)|S\{i}| + w′i(S \ {i}) otherwise
,
where M ≥ max
S⊆N
|w′i(S)|+ 2.
Then it is easy to see that z(i)′i = w
′
i and z(i) is a strictly convex game.
The class of strictly convex games is an M -closed class of games (see Lemma
3.9 in Pinte´r (2009) p. 6).
Step 6 : We can apply Theorem 4.1 such that A is the class of totally
balanced / exact games and B is the class of strictly convex games. 
10Since every exact game is totally balanced, and in the proof we use only that w′k(S \
{k}) = v′k(S \ {k}) ≥ v′k(∅) = w′k(∅) (which is true for both types of games), it is enough
to consider only a game v such that v′k(S \ {k}) ≥ v′k(∅).
17
References
Acerbi C., Scandolo G., 2008. Liquidity risk theory and coherent measures
of risk. Quantitative Finance 8, 681–692.
Acerbi C., Tasche D., 2002. On the coherence of expected shortfall. Journal
of Banking and Finance 26, 1487–1504.
Artzner P.F., Delbaen F., Eber J.M., Heath D., 1999. Coherent measures of
risk. Mathematical Finance 9, 203–228.
Branzei R., Tijs S., Zarzuelo J., 2009. Convex multi-choice games: Charac-
terizations and monotonic allocation schemes. European Journal of Oper-
ational Research 198, 571–575.
Buch A., Dorfleitner G., 2008. Coherent risk measures, coherent capital
allocations and the gradient allocation principle. Insurance: Mathematics
and Economics 42 (1), 235–242.
Calleja P., Borm P., Hendrickx R., 2005. Multi-issue allocation situations.
European Journal of Operational Research 164, 730–747.
Casas-Me´ndez B., Garc´ıa-Jurado I., van den Nouweland A., Va´zquez-Brage
M., 2003. An extension of the τ -value to games with coalition structures.
European Journal of Operational Research 148, 494–513.
Cont R., 2001. Empirical properties of asset returns: Stylized facts and
statistical issues. Quantitative Finance 1, 223–236.
Cso´ka P., Herings P.J.J., Ko´czy L.A´., 2007. Coherent measures of risk from
a general equilibrium perspective. Journal of Banking and Finance 31 (8),
2517–2534.
Cso´ka P., Herings P.J.J., Ko´czy L.A´., 2009. Stable allocations of risk. Games
and Economic Behavior 67 (1), 266–276.
Denault M., 2001. Coherent allocation of risk capital. Journal of Risk 4 (1),
1–34.
Dubey P., Shapley L.S., 1984. Totally balanced games arising from controlled
programming problems. Mathematical Programming 29, 245–267.
Gillies D.B., 1959. Solutions to general non-zero-sum games, vol. IV of Con-
tributions to the Theory of Games. Princeton University Press.
18
Kalai E., Zemel E., 1982a. Generalized network problems yielding totally
balanced games. Operations Research 30, 998–1008.
Kalai E., Zemel E., 1982b. Totally balanced games and games of flow. Math-
ematics of Operations Research 7, 476–478.
Kalkbrener M., 2005. An axiomatic approach to capital allocation. Mathe-
matical Finance 15 (3), 425–437.
Kim J.H.T., Hardy M.R., 2009. A capital allocation based on a solvency
exchange option. Insurance Mathematics and Economics 44, 357–366.
Legut J., 1990. On totally balanced games arising from cooperation in fair
division. Games and Economic Behavior 2, 47–60.
Lintner J., 1965. The valuation of risky assets and the selection of risky
investments in stock portfolios and capital budgets. Review of Economics
and Statistics 47, 13–37.
Owen G., 1975. On the core of linear production games. Mathematical
Programming 9, 358–370.
Pinte´r M., 2009. Young’s axiomatization of the Shapley value - a new proof.
arXiv:0805.2797v2 .
Rabie M.A., 1981. A note on the exact games. International Journal of Game
Theory 10 (3-4), 131–132.
Schmeidler D., 1972. Cores of exact games. Journal of Mathematical Analysis
and Applications 40, 214–225.
Shapley L.S., 1953. A value for n-person games. In: H.W. Kuhn, A.W.
Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II, vol. 28 of Annals
of Mathematics Studies. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pages 307–
317.
Shapley L.S., 1971. Cores of convex games. International Journal of Game
Theory 1, 11–26.
Shapley L.S., Shubik M., 1969. On market games. Journal of Economic
Theory 1, 9–25.
Sharpe W.F., 1964. Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium
under conditions of risk. Journal of Finance 19, 425–442.
19
Tijs S., Parthasarathy T., Potters J., Prassad V.R., 1984. Permutation
games: Another class of totally balanced games. OR Spektrum 6, 119–123.
Valdez E.A., Chernih A., 2003. Wang’s capital allocation formula for ellipti-
cally contoured distributions. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 33,
517–532.
Young H.P., 1985. Monotonic solutions of cooperative games. International
Journal of Game Theory 14, 65–72.
20
